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Re: Notes on John Hart Testimony

Early on in the interview with the Committee Hart notes that on June 11, 1962, the deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of CI wrote that Nosenko had clearly established his bone fides. This was Peter Bagley. Bagley was later involved in the three year effort to break Nosenko at the orders of Angleton and Helms.

Early on (p. 3) Hart discusses a Mr. X--Anatoli Golitsin. He ~~is~~ was diagnosed as paranoid by a CIA psychiatrist. Mr. Golitsin (Mr. X) was obsessed with a KGB massive disinformation plot to take over the West. . . Mr. X, according to Hart, believed that the stories of the USSR-Chinese fall out was simply a KGB disinformation campaign. He was believed by certain elements in the CIA. Hart contends it was this Mr. X who finally accused Nosenko of being part of a KGB exercise to discredit him and to do this by spreading disinformation. Golitsin was trying to maintain his "importance" to the CIA, the US Government, and to the federal tax dollar, by eliminating all competition. It was his testimony to the effect that Nosenko was out to discredit him that precipitated the allegations that Nosenko was a "plant," etc. and believed by the CIA at this time (1964-1967).

Nosenko and the FBI. Federal Bureau believed Nosenko. N. talked to FBI in Jan and February. Just at the time he was "swept up" by the CIA. February 1964 Nosenko came under CIA control in control house.

Hart description of CIA attempt to "break" Nosenko. Interrogation not to find out what Nosenko knew, etc. . . But to get Nosenko to reveal that he was a "plant."

Nosenko did not break. By 1966 Helms grew weary of the "game." He wanted results. Results in 2 months.

Hart quotes a letter from the deputy chief of the SB using the term "eventual disposal" of subject.

The Dodd-Hart exchange: Here Hart exceeds Dodd's own characterization of the CIA handling of the Nosenko interrogation (intimidation) as failing miserably. Failing to get from Nosenko any information he might have had about Oswald in Russia.

Finally, Hart makes the point that all the time Nosenko spent under CIA and was sweated for three years the Agency made no effort to find out anything about Oswald in Russia.

Committee never gets anything about Oswald from the Hart testimony. Hart was purposeively selected because he apparently knew nothing about Oswald or was certain to say nothing. All that Hart does is credit Nosenko's bone fides. Justify the agency's use of him and strikes a blow at the old CIA--The Helms crowd.